
PhD, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
David Pérez-Castrillo is Professor of Economics at UAB, Research Fellow at MOVE, and BSE Research Professor. He is also Research Fellow of CESifo, and has been elected Second Vice President of the Spanish Economic Association (from January 2017).
His research interests are in Economics of Science and Innovation, Economics of Information, and Game Theory. He is currently involved in research related with the analysis of public programs to support academic research, the financing of startups, and mechanism design. Among other duties, he has been president of the Social Science Commission for Research Evaluation for the Catalan Government, President and General Secretary of the South-European Association of Economic Theory, and Officer of the Executive Committee of the European Association of Research in Industrial Economics.
He has published in leading journals such as American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Management Science, and Games and Economic Behavior. He obtained the Distinció de la Generalitat de Catalunya for young researchers in 2001 and the ICREA Academia Award in 2009, 2015, and 2019. He received the Arrow Prize in Theoretical Economics in 2006. He has been a visiting professor at many universities, such as the University of California-San Diego, the University of Copenhagen, and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Professor Pérez-Castrillo was Director of the BSE Master in the Economics of Science and Innovation (2007-2012).
Working Papers
Institutional Blockholders and Corporate Innovation
Publications
Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: Applicants, panellists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds
R & D Management, Vol.53, No 5, 819-839, November 2023, https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12601Open Access
Early individual stakeholders, first venture capital investment, and exit in the UK startup ecosystem
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.80, June 2023, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102420Open Access
Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
Economic Theory, January 2023, 10.1007/s00199-022-01483-9Open Access