Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

• Authors: David Pérez-Castrillo.
• BSE Working Paper: 110165 | September 15
• Keywords: matching , Competitive Equilibrium , manipulability , optimal competitive equilibrium , competitive equilibrium mechanism , competitive equilibrium rule
• JEL codes: C78, D78
• matching
• Competitive Equilibrium
• manipulability
• optimal competitive equilibrium
• competitive equilibrium mechanism
• competitive equilibrium rule

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).