The Unintended Consequences of Post-Disaster Policies

• Authors: Marcel Henkel, Eunjee Kwon and Pierre Magontier
• BSE Working Paper: 1566 | March 2026
• Keywords: natural disasters, political budget cycles
• JEL codes: Q54, D72, H53, H84

We document that U.S. hurricanes striking close to Election Day trigger larger public spending responses and sustained population inflows than comparable hurricanes occurring between elections. Exploiting quasi-random variation in hurricane timing, we show that electoral incentives shape post- disaster policy with lasting spatial consequences. A quantitative spatial equilibrium model implies that eliminating these electoral timing distortions would raise aggregate welfare by 0.025%, but the aggregate gain masks an 18:1 asymmetry in per-capita stakes between losers and gainers. This distributional asymmetry rationalizes the persistence of these electoral distortions.