Multilateral Bargaining with Information Spillovers

• Authors: Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs and Caio Lorecchio
• BSE Working Paper: 1598 | September 2026

We study dynamic monopoly pricing with multiple buyers whose valuations are privately known and correlated, so that one buyer ’s purchase reveals information about the valuations of others. Without seller commitment, these information spillovers alter future pricing incentives and feed back into current demand. We show that they generate strategic complementarities in buyers’ purchase decisions, making demand non-monotone and giving rise to equilibrium multiplicity. Information spillovers can either strengthen or weaken the seller ’s effective commitment power, implying that seller revenue, buyer surplus, and total welfare are generically non-monotonic in the strength of spillovers. We characterize when these spillovers encourage data investment and experimentation, as well as facilitate coordination that mitigates hold-up.