Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation

• Authors: Joaquim Silvestre and Antoni Bosch-Domènech.
• game theory
• Behavioral and Experimental Economics
• Review of Social Economy

We report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks. © 2019, © 2019 The Association for Social Economics.