Voting by Committees under Constraints

  • Authors: Jordi Massó and Salvador Barberà.
  • BSE Working Paper: 112335 | September 15
  • Keywords: voting , strategy-proofness , additive and separable preferences
  • JEL codes: D7
  • voting
  • strategy-proofness
  • additive and separable preferences
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Abstract

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters’ preferences are separable or additively representable.

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