Farsighted House Allocation

  • Authors: Flip Klijn.
  • BSE Working Paper: 112311 | September 15
  • Keywords: top trading cycles , housing markets , indivisible goods , farsightedness , von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets , competitive allocations
  • JEL codes: D63, D70
  • top trading cycles
  • housing markets
  • indivisible goods
  • farsightedness
  • von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
  • competitive allocations
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Abstract

In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.

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