Executive Constraints as Robust Control

• Authors: Hannes Mueller.
• BSE Working Paper: 110527 | September 18
• Keywords: uncertainty , elections , political institutions , executive constraints , robust control , checks and balances
• JEL codes: E02, O43, D02, D60, D72
• uncertainty
• elections
• political institutions
• executive constraints
• robust control
• checks and balances

This paper looks at the case for executive constraints in a world of imperfect electoral accountability and policy risk. It develops a model in which policy can be subject to judicial oversight by an imperfectly informed judiciary. Limiting discretion can be good for reducing risk but can worsen incentives creating a non-trivial trade-off for voters. We argue that this is always resolved in favor of executive constraints when looking at the worst case scenario meaning that executive constraints are best justified as a form of robust control.