Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?

  • Authors: Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel.
  • BSE Working Paper: 405 | September 15
  • Keywords: experiments , Inequity aversion , interdependent preferences , social welfare maximizing , belief elicitation , social information , mixture-of-types models
  • JEL codes: C72
  • experiments
  • Inequity aversion
  • interdependent preferences
  • social welfare maximizing
  • belief elicitation
  • social information
  • mixture-of-types models

Abstract

C91

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