Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?

Authors: Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey Biel
BSE Working Paper: 405 | September 2015
Keywords: experiments, Inequity aversion, interdependent preferences, social welfare maximizing, belief elicitation, social information, mixture-of-types models
JEL codes: C72

Abstract

C91

DOI: 10.3982/QE1

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