Effort or Entitlement? Evidence from Dynastic Legislators in India

  • Authors: Abhinav Khemka and Sunakshi Rai Jindal
  • BSE Working Paper: 1613 | November 2026
  • Keywords: regression discontinuity, India, dynastic legislators, constituency service, audit experiments, political effort
  • JEL codes: D72, H70, O12
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Abstract

Do dynastic politicians exert less political effort than their non-dynastic counterparts? Using a pre-registered field experiment with 4,608 national and state legislators in India and a regres- sion discontinuity design based on close elections, this paper tests whether legislators’ political family connections affect their responsiveness to constituency service requests. We find that dynastic legislators are 12.4 percentage points more likely to respond than non-dynastic legis- lators. This difference does not depend on the partisan alignment of the sender or on the type of good requested. It is instead concentrated among dynasts whose families have not previously won the seats they represent, and among legislators facing an election within the next year. Using administrative data, we further show that a larger share of registered households receive work under India’s rural employment guarantee program in constituencies that elect dynas- tic legislators. However, dynastic legislators exhibit lower legislative engagement, attending a smaller share of legislative sittings. These findings suggest that dynastic legislators devote more effort to aspects of their representative role that are directly visible to voters and less to legislative activity.

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