Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown

  • Authors: Alexander Frug.
  • BSE Working Paper: 110697 | December 20
  • Keywords: Contagion , cheap talk
  • JEL codes: D83
  • Contagion
  • cheap talk
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Abstract

We introduce a new channel for breakdown of cheap talk communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Our framework has the following novel feature: conditional on interacting, both parties agree on the optimal action in each state, but there are sender types with which the receiver prefers not to interact. We show that for a broad class of preferences, any interval equilibrium induces only finitely many actions in the support of the receiver’s strategy. We also show that introducing a second stage with noisy signals on the sender type has a dramatic effect on the first-stage communication.

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