Strategy-proof social choice

  • Authors: Salvador Barberà.
  • BSE Working Paper: 109916 | September 15
  • Keywords: voting , strategy-proofness , Social Choice , Dominant Strategies , Domain Restrictions
  • JEL codes: D7, D51, C7, H41
  • voting
  • strategy-proofness
  • Social Choice
  • Dominant Strategies
  • Domain Restrictions
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Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by  K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

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