Search and Matching in the Labor Market without Unemployment Insurance

  • Authors: Francesc Obiols-Homs.
  • BSE Working Paper: 110155 | September 15
  • Keywords: search , incomplete markets , general equilibrium
  • JEL codes: D52, D58, E24, J22
  • search
  • incomplete markets
  • general equilibrium
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Abstract

I study the effect of the market arrangement on competitive allocations in a model in which the distribution of idiosyncratic uncertainty is determined endogenously. The particular application I consider is a search model of the labor market embedded in a general equilibrium model with production and asset accumulation. It is shown that costly search with incomplete markets introduces a wealth effect at low levels of wealth such that poor agents do not search much or even find optimal not to look for a job. The combination of this effect with the usual one at higher wealth levels delivers equilibrium allocations that are remarkably different from the one that obtains under complete markets. I also use numerical methods to obtain quantitative predictions in a calibrated version of the model. The effect of the market arrangement remains dramatically large due to search externalities.

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