The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation

  • Authors: José-Luis Peydró.
  • BSE Working Paper: 110571 | May 19
  • Keywords: shadow banks , risk-based capital regulation , Basel III , interactions between banks and nonbanks , trading by banks , distressed debt
  • JEL codes: G01, G21, G23, G28
  • shadow banks
  • risk-based capital regulation
  • Basel III
  • interactions between banks and nonbanks
  • trading by banks
  • distressed debt
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Abstract

We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation has important spillovers: during the 2008 crisis, loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility.

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