The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis

• Authors: Benito Arruñada.
• BSE Working Paper: 112226 | February 20
• Keywords: competition , welfare , Incentives , Bureaucracy , registries , internal markets , user fees , user choice , privatization
• JEL codes: H11, H42, H51, H52, K23
• competition
• welfare
• Incentives
• Bureaucracy
• registries
• internal markets
• user fees
• user choice
• privatization

This chapter analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or “discretionary expense centers” used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that market forces may play a better role in organizing public registries when they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while, at the same time, reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.