A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

  • Authors: Salvador Barberà.
  • BSE Working Paper: 112265 | September 15
  • Keywords: Coalition formation , stability , Hedonic Game
  • JEL codes: C71
  • Coalition formation
  • stability
  • Hedonic Game
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Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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