Median Stable Matching for College Admission

  • Authors: Flip Klijn.
  • BSE Working Paper: 1165 | September 15
  • Keywords: fairness , stability , matching , College admissions problem
  • JEL codes: C78, D63
  • fairness
  • stability
  • matching
  • College admissions problem
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Abstract

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

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