How Should we Model Property? Thinking with my Critics

• Authors: Benito Arruñada.
• BSE Working Paper: 110444 | June 17
• Keywords: transaction costs , Externalities , enforcement , Property rights , impersonal exchange , public ordering , private ordering
• JEL codes: D23, K11, K12, G38, H41, O17, P48
• transaction costs
• Externalities
• enforcement
• Property rights
• impersonal exchange
• public ordering
• private ordering

Inspired by comments made by Allen (2017), Lueck (2017), Ménard (2017) and Smith (2017), this response clarifies and deepens the analysis in Arruñada (2017a). Its main argument is that to deal with the complexity of property we must abstract secondary elements, such as the physical dimensions of some types of assets, and focus on the interaction between transactions. This sequential-exchange framework captures the main problem of property in the current environment of impersonal markets. It also provides criteria to compare private and public ordering, as well as to organize public solutions that enable new forms of private ordering. The analysis applies the lessons in Coase (1960) to property by not only comparing realities but also maintaining his separate treatment of the definition of property rights and transaction costs. However, it replaces his contractual, single-exchange, framework for one in which contracts interact, causing exchange externalities.