Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

  • Authors: Hans-Joachim Voth.
  • BSE Working Paper: 112250 | September 15
  • Keywords: credit rationing , Economic development , banking , financial repression , usury laws , natural experiments , lending decisions
  • JEL codes: O16, G21, N23
  • credit rationing
  • Economic development
  • banking
  • financial repression
  • usury laws
  • natural experiments
  • lending decisions
Download PDF Download pdf Icon

Abstract

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment in the change in the English usury laws in 1714 to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little “social capital.” While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

Subscribe to our newsletter
Want to receive the latest news and updates from the BSE? Share your details below.
Founding institutions
Distinctions
Logo BSE
© Barcelona Graduate School of
Economics. All rights reserved.
YoutubeFacebookLinkedinInstagramX