Do Incompetent Politicians Breed Populist Voters? Evidence from Italian Municipalities

  • Authors: Giacomo Ponzetto.
  • BSE Working Paper: 1388 | March 23
  • Keywords: populism , government efficiency , politician quality , political agency
  • JEL codes: D72, D73, H70
  • populism
  • government efficiency
  • politician quality
  • political agency
Download PDF Download pdf Icon

Abstract

Poor performance by the established political class can drive voters towards anti-establishment outsiders. Is the ineffectiveness of incumbent politicians an important driver of the recent rise of populist parties? We provide an empirical test exploiting a sharp discontinuity in the wage of local politicians as a function of population in Italian municipalities. We find that the more skilled local politicians and more effective local government in municipalities above the threshold cause a significant drop in voter support for the populist Five-Star Movement in regional and national elections. Support for incumbent governing parties increases instead.

Subscribe to our newsletter
Want to receive the latest news and updates from the BSE? Share your details below.
Founding institutions
Distinctions
Logo BSE
© Barcelona Graduate School of
Economics. All rights reserved.
YoutubeFacebookLinkedinInstagramX