On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games

  • BSE Working Paper: 112229 | September 15
  • Keywords: core , Cooperative TU games , reasonable set
  • JEL codes: C71, C78
  • core
  • Cooperative TU games
  • reasonable set
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Abstract

We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new property, called max-intersection, related with the vector lattice structure of cooperative games with transferable utility. In particular, it is shown that the core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonability, max-intersection and modularity.

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