On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria

• Authors: Alejandro Neme.
• BSE Working Paper: 438 | September 15
• Keywords: assignment game , core , Competitive Equilibrium , Set-wise stability
• JEL codes: C78, D78
• assignment game
• core
• Competitive Equilibrium
• Set-wise stability

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.